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On April 29, 2014, Clayton Lockett was executed
by lethal injection in Oklahoma.1 Lockett was convicted
of murdering nineteen-year-old Stephanie Neiman,
whom he shot twice with a shotgun and then buried while
still alive, with the help of his accomplices.2 Of his own
volition,3 Lockett confessed three days later and was
subsequently convicted and sentenced to death. Lockett’s
death resulted from a botched lethal injection.4 The drugs

Jeffrey E. Stern, The Cruel and Unusual Execution of Clayton
Lockett, THE ATLANTIC (June 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2015/06/execution-clayton-lockett/392069/.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 See id. (“Governor Fallin gave a press conference to remind
everyone about Lockett’s crimes, voice her support for the
1
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used to execute Lockett were both confidential and
experimental.5 The intravenous line (“IV”) used to render
Lockett unconscious was pulled from his vein and became
infiltrated, and much of the lethal drugs did not make it
into Lockett’s bloodstream.6 As a result, Lockett awoke
and sat up on the gurney in the middle of his execution,
unable to speak, with blood pooling beneath him caused
by the infiltrated IV.7 The execution was botched to such
a level that the warden actually tried to stop it,
eventually calling and briefing the governor on the
situation.8 However, there were already enough drugs in
Lockett’s system; he died ten minutes later, apparently
in agony the entire time.9
Prior to this incident, on April 23, 2014, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court dissolved a stay of execution
and rendered a per curiam opinion that resulted in
Lockett’s execution.10 Lockett v. Evans is the result of
more than ten years of interrelated appeals and
constitutional challenges, spanning federal courts of
appeals and state courts of last resort.11 Lockett’s later
appeals, challenging a lethal injection disclosure
prohibition statute, also included Charles Warner, a man
death penalty, and announce an investigation into what had
gone wrong.”).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. (“Ten minutes later, at 7:06 p.m., Clayton Lockett was
declared dead. He had been dying amidst all the chaos, just
very slowly and in apparent agony.”).
10 Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 492 (Okla., 2014) (“The stay
of execution entered by this Court on April 21, 2014, is hereby
dissolved.”).
11 See, e.g., Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2013);
Lockett v. Workman, No. CIV-03-734-F, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157157 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2011); Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d
58 (Okla. 2014); Warner v. State, 29 P.3d 569 (Okla. Crim. App.
2001).
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facing execution for raping and murdering an elevenmonth-old baby.12 The state of Oklahoma executed
Warner on January 15, 2015,13 after a 180-day stay of
execution during which authorities investigated the
botched execution of Lockett.14 Warner’s last words were,
“My body is on fire.”15
Warner’s and Lockett’s appeal process was unique
because they challenged the constitutionality of a law
that classified the lethal injection drugs used to execute
them.16 If Warner and Lockett succeeded in their
constitutional challenge, their executions would be
stayed. In forty-eight states, there would be no question
that a court of last resort could render a decision on the
constitutionality of a lethal injection classification law.
Oklahoma, however, is not one of them, due to its
bifurcated court of last resort structure. The only other
state that maintains a bifurcated structure of civil and

Diana Baldwin, Man Found Guilty of Baby Rape, Murder,
NEWSOK (June 24, 2003), http://newsok.com/man-foundguilty-of-baby-rape-murder/article/1934580.
13 Cary Aspinwall, Charles Warner is Executed, TULSA WORLD
(Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/courts/charleswarner-is-executed-here-s-the-story-of-his/article_af39c54208d0-5bd6-80ac-01a6f1c668ee.html.
14 Katie Fretland, Oklahoma Agrees to 180 Day Stay of
Execution for Death-row Inmate, THE GUARDIAN (May 8, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/oklahoma180-day-stay-execution-charles-warner. The Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals issued the stay of execution for Mr.
Warner, rather than the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Id.
15 Sean Murphy, Charles Warner Executed: Baby Killer Says
‘My Body Is On Fire’ During Lethal Injection In Oklahoma,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2015/01/15/charles-frederick-warner-executed_n_6483040.html.
16 Lockett, 356 P.3d at 61 (“The appeal by the DOC and its
interim Director has placed the issue of the secrecy provision
of section 1015(B) undisputedly within this Court's appellate
jurisdiction.”).
12
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criminal courts of last resort is Texas.17 This Article
explores the history of Texas’s and Oklahoma’s
bifurcated courts of last resort, the similarities and
differences between the two systems, as well as some of
the controversies that have arisen due to jurisdictional
questions. The Article concludes with a recommendation
that Oklahoma and Texas each adopt a unified court of
last resort.
When cases arise that implicate both civil and
criminal issues, the Oklahoma and Texas judiciaries are
likely to suffer from “judicial hot potato,” by sending the
cases back and forth between the criminal and civil
divisions of the respective court.18 That is not to say,
however, that questions of jurisdiction do not arise in
unified systems, such as the United States federal courts.
The key difference there lies in the vesting of a single
court, rather than dual courts, with the final decision on
whether a case is civil or criminal in nature. Although no
system is perfect, by adopting a unified court of last
resort, Texas and Oklahoma will have a single decisionmaker with a clear grant of jurisdiction to determine the
classification of cases.

LESTER BERNHARDT ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA
220 (1939) (“[N]o state in the Union except Texas and
Oklahoma has a separate court of criminal appeals.”); see also
Ben L. Mesches, Bifurcated Appellate Review: The Texas Story
of Two High Courts, 53 JUDGES’ J. 4 (2014).
18 The colloquial phrase “hot potato” is defined as “a
controversial question or issue that involves unpleasant or
dangerous consequences for anyone dealing with it.” Hot
Potato, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/hot%20potato. The phrase derives from the popular
children’s party game in which participants toss to each other
a small object resembling a potato while music is playing. See
generally JACK MAGUIRE, HOPSCOTCH, HANGMAN, HOT POTATO
& HA HA HA: A RULEBOOK OF CHILDREN’S GAMES (1990). When
the music stops playing, the player holding the object is
eliminated and cannot proceed to the next round. Id.
17
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I. History
Both Texas’s and Oklahoma’s court structures
have evolved over time, becoming the labyrinths they
remain today. Political motivations and increased case
volume have contributed to the byzantine network of trial
and appellate courts that Texas maintains. In Oklahoma,
large-scale reforms were achieved in the wake of scandal,
but those reforms failed to address the problems inherent
in bifurcated courts of last resort. Both states have failed
to eliminate their bifurcated structures throughout their
history, despite attempts to do so.
A. Texas
1. Pre-Civil War
Texas became a republic in 1836,19 after declaring
independence from Mexico.20 Texas’s first judiciary as an
independent nation had a single supreme court composed
of a chief justice and associate justices.21 The associate
justices were judges of the district courts and functioned
as the supreme court when a majority was present, which
constituted a quorum.22 These provisions were in the
original draft of the constitutional convention of 1836 as
well,23 likely indicating that the judiciary was not a
contested issue throughout the convention.

REP. OF TEX. CONST. pmbl. (1836).
TEX. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1836).
21 REP. OF TEX. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1–9 (1836).
22 Id. § 7.
23 JOURNALS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE FREE, SOVEREIGN, AND
INDEPENDENT PEOPLE OF TEXAS, IN GENERAL CONVENTION,
ASSEMBLED 821–904 (H.P.N. Gammel, ed., Gammel Book Co.
1898) (1836).
19
20
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In 1845, the United States annexed Texas.24 With its
annexation, Texas adopted a state constitution.25 The
new constitution changed the structure of the judiciary,
with three justices (one chief justice and two associate
justices) sitting on the supreme court, any two of whom
would constitute a quorum.26 The 1845 Constitution
specifically granted habeas corpus jurisdiction to the
Texas Supreme Court, a power it did not retain in the
1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas.27 In addition,
the 1845 Constitution gave district courts original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases, which those courts did
not retain under the 1836 Constitution.28
In 1861, Texas seceded from the United States and
ratified a new constitution upon joining the Confederate
States of America.29 Notably, the 1861 Secession
Constitution did not come with changes to the judicial
department, however. The Constitution of 1861 kept the
judiciary provisions in Article IV, and even maintained
the same sections.30 Texas became a member of the
Confederate States of America on March 23, 1861, when
the Secession Convention adjourned for the last time.31
2. Reconstruction
After the Civil War, Texas began a tumultuous
period of constitutional change in its judiciary. During
Reconstruction, Texas was subject to federal military
C.T. Neu, Annexation, HANDBOOK OF TEXAS ONLINE (Sept. 23,
2015), https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mga02.
25 Id.
26 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (1845).
27 Id. § 3.
28 Id. § 10.
29 JOURNAL OF THE SECESSION CONVENTION OF TEXAS 8
(William Winkler, ed., 1912) (1861).
30 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1–5, 10 (1861).
31 Walter L. Buenger, Secession Convention, HANDBOOK OF
TEXAS ONLINE (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.tshaonline.org/
handbook/online/articles/mjs01.
24
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occupation and ousted all five supreme court justices on
September 10, 1867.32 Between 1866 and 1876 Texas had
three different constitutions.33
a. Constitution of Texas (1866)
The Constitution of 1866 was written in order to
regain admittance to the Union. Among other changes,
the Constitution of 1866 significantly changed the
structure of the Texas judiciary. Section 1 of Article IV
added new constitutional courts (courts created by the
constitution) including criminal courts, county courts,
and corporation courts.34 The county courts had original
jurisdiction in “all misdemeanors and petty offences, as
the same are now, or may hereafter be defined by law; of
such civil cases, where the matter in controversy shall
not exceed five hundred dollars.”35 The Constitution of
1866 also added justices of the peace, whose jurisdiction
is further defined by law, and who had jurisdiction in civil
matters totaling less than $100.36
The Constitution of 1866 also added two more
justices to the Texas Supreme Court, for a total of four
associate justices and one chief justice.37 The appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court changed slightly in
1866. Formerly, the supreme court had appellate
jurisdiction that extended to all matters, but the
legislature could limit appellate jurisdiction in criminal
cases and interlocutory judgments.38 In the 1866
Hans W. Baade, Chapters in the History of the Supreme Court
of Texas: Reconstruction and “Redemption” (1866-1882), 40 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 17, 25 (2008).
33 TEX. CONST. art. V (1876); TEX. CONST. art. V (1869); TEX.
CONST. art. IV (1868); TEX. CONST. art. IV (1866).
34 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (1866).
35 Id. § 16.
36 Id. § 19.
37 Id. § 2.
38 TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1861).
32
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Constitution, the legislature could no longer limit felony
criminal jurisdiction from the supreme court through
law.39 The Constitution of 1866 also provided for the
election of district judges and expanded their jurisdiction
beyond that of the Constitution of 1861 to include
appellate jurisdiction from the inferior courts, original
jurisdiction in cases dealing with slander or libel, and
suits for the trial or title to land.40
b. Constitution of 1869
Shortly after the ratification of the Constitution of
1866, Winfield Scott Hancock, the military commander
over Texas during Reconstruction, called for an election
in Texas to determine whether a new constitution should
be created.41 Texans overwhelmingly voted for a new
constitutional convention, and the convention assembled
on June 1, 1868.42 The convention lasted 150 days but the
delegates did not complete a constitution.43 Nonetheless,
what was written was submitted to the voters of the state
and became the Constitution of 1869.44
The judicial department, particularly the Texas
Supreme Court, was significantly changed in the
Constitution of 1869. The supreme court was reduced to
three justices45 who were subjected to nine-year term
limits, rather than the ten-year terms under the
Constitution of 1866.46 The district court judges retained
appellate jurisdiction of inferior courts.47 The county
TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (1866).
Id. § 6.
41 Claude Elliot, Constitutional Convention of 1868-69,
HANDBOOK
OF
TEXAS
ONLINE
(June
12,
2010),
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mjc04.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 TEX. CONST. art. V, § II (1869).
46 Id.
47 Id. § VII.
39
40
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courts were merged with the justice of the peace courts,
the extent of their jurisdiction to be delineated by the
legislature.48
c. Constitution of 1876
The Constitution of 1876 is the current
constitution of Texas, but it has been amended numerous
times since its ratification in 1876.49 The Constitution of
1876 differed greatly from the Constitution of 1869. It
included, as constitutional requirements, a supreme
court, a court of appeals, district courts, county courts,
commissioners’ courts, courts of justices of the peace, and
other courts that may be established by law.50 The
Constitution of 1876 also gave the legislature the ability
to establish specifically criminal district courts as long as
the city had over 30,000 residents.51 The Texas Supreme
Court remained a three-justice court,52 but, critically, its
jurisdiction over criminal matters was eliminated. The
supreme court had civil appellate jurisdiction only,
reaching only the cases in which the district courts had
original or appellate jurisdiction.53 With the absence of
criminal jurisdiction, the supreme court also lost the
ability to issue writs of habeas corpus.
The Constitution of 1876 created the Texas Court
of Appeals, possibly in response to a congested docket.54
Contrary to its usual nomenclature, the court of appeals
was not an intermediate appeals court. Rather, it had
exclusive jurisdiction in all criminal matters, as well as
Id. § XX.
See, e.g., TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT
ONE, THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL
OVERVIEW 3–5 (1990).
50 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1 (1876).
51 Id.
52 Id. § 2.
53 Id. § 3.
54In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 379 (Tex. 2011).
48
49
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some civil cases arising from the county courts.55 The
court of appeals was also elected every six years and
consisted of three sitting judges.56
There are multiple theories for the bifurcation of
civil and criminal jurisdiction between the Texas
Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Appeals.57 Most
hold the view that the courts’ jurisdiction was bifurcated
due to a backlog of cases.
Others hold the view that the Constitution of 1876
was a “revanchist document: The fruition of a resurgence
of state power by segregationist, mostly ex-Confederate
Democrats
after
a
decade
under
Union-run
Reconstruction.”58 The resurgence of state power by
segregationists allowed the Texas Democrats to change
the constitution in order to bypass a “radical Republican”
reconstruction court.59 This new court would allow the
Democrats to ignore odious precedent laid down by the
Texas Supreme Court, further reinforced by the fact that
in the new constitution only the Texas Court of Appeals
could hear habeas petitions during a time of martial
law.60 The state could now avoid a reconstruction court
when trying to enforce Jim Crow laws.61
Either way, the bifurcated system failed to
achieve what the drafters wanted. By 1879, the courts
continued to fall behind in their caseloads, and the
TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6 (1876).
Id. § 5.
57 See Maurice Chammah, Bill Renews Debate on Merging Top
Two Courts, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Dec. 13, 2012, 6:00 AM),
http://www.texastribune.org/2012/12/13/bill-merge-highestcourts-brings-back-old-debate/; Scott Henson, Caveats to
Debate on Merging Texas Supreme Court, Court of Criminal
Appeals, GRITS FOR BREAKFAST (Dec. 13, 2012, 11:00 AM),
http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2012/12/caveats-todebate-on-merging-texas.html.
58 Henson, supra note 57.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
55
56
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legislature created a commission of appeals.62 This too
failed, and by 1891, the citizenry of Texas voted to
entirely supplant the judicial article of the Constitution
of 1876.63
3. Amendments to 1876 Constitution
a. 1891 Amendment
In 1891, the state of Texas adopted a wholesale
replacement of its judiciary through an amendment.64
The 1891 amendment removed the Texas Court of
Appeals and replaced it with the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals and the Texas Court of Civil Appeals.65 Thus, the
new system added a mid-level appeals court and gave the
Texas Supreme Court the responsibility of resolving
conflicts between the courts of civil appeals.66
The Texas Supreme Court maintained its limit of
three sitting justices, as did the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals.67 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals was also
composed of three judges per court.68 After adopting the
1891 amendment, the Texas legislature added two more

James T. Worthen, The Organizational & Structural
Development of Intermediate Appellate Courts in Texas, 1892–
2003, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 33, 34 (2004).
63 Id. at 35.
64 See generally S.J. Res. 16, 22d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1891).
65 Id. § 1.
66 Id. Additionally, it is important to note that the 1891
amendment gave the Texas Supreme Court the ability to issue
writs of habeas corpus, which had not been present in the
Constitution of 1876. S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tex.
1891); see also Tex. Const. art. V § 3 (1876). The 1891
amendment also explicitly eliminated the use of the writ of
mandamus by the Texas Supreme Court against the Governor.
S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 3 (Tex. 1891).
67 S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. at §§ 2, 4 (Tex. 1891).
68 Id. § 6.
62
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courts of appeal.69 The term limits remained six years for
each justice and judge, with each elected by popular
vote.70 No additional courts were changed by the 1891
amendment.71
The next set of constitutional amendments
affecting the judiciary did not occur until 1954.72 That
does not mean, however, that there were no legislative
changes to the judiciary. Between 1893 and 1967, Texas
added eleven new appellate districts.73 The further
constitutional changes were concerned, primarily, with
the supreme court and the court of criminal appeals.
Before addressing these changes, I will briefly describe
what has occurred at the trial court level since 1876.
b. Trial Courts in Texas
Texas has a dizzying array of trial courts.
Constitutional trial courts include district, county, and
justice of the peace courts. There are currently 507
district courts across the state.74 Unfortunately, the
legislature, in an effort to deal with changing caseloads,
has created statutory district courts that have specific
jurisdictional preferences.75 Thus, a litigant will have to
determine the correct district court in which to bring her
W.O. Murray, Our Courts of Civil Appeals, 25 TEX. B.J. 269,
270 (1962).
70 S.J. Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. at §§ 2, 4, 6 (Tex. 1891).
71 There still remained district courts, county courts,
commissioner’s courts, and courts of justices of the peace. S.J.
Res. 16, 22d Reg. Sess. § 1 (Tex. 1891).
72 TEXAS LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXAS
CONSTITUTION SINCE 1876 65–70 (Feb. 2016).
73 See Worthen, supra note 62 at 36.
74
State District Courts, TEXAS STATE DIRECTORY,
https://www.txdirectory.com/online/dist/ (last visited on Dec. 2,
2016).
75 TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT ONE, THE
TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW 30
(1990).
69
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claim, even though she may live within the geographical
confines of multiple district courts. Litigation in Texas is
further confused by the existence of the county courts,
which consist of statutory county courts and
constitutional county courts.76 Statutory county courts
actually have no common thread: They are simply a
patchwork creation of local judicial needs.77 There is no
commonality among them. Constitutional county courts
are required in each county, where the judge is the chief
executive officer of the county. A county court judge is not
constitutionally required to be an attorney, and she has
limited jurisdiction in both civil and criminal cases.78
Finally, there are the justice of the peace courts.
These courts have varying jurisdiction by statute and
primarily operate as small claims courts and cases
involving traffic fines.79 Only about eight percent of the
justices of the peace are lawyers,80 yet justice of the peace
courts are responsible for a significant portion of state
revenue.81
There are many other forms of trial courts in
Texas, but the subject is beyond the scope of this Article.82
It is enough to know that the Texas judicial system
includes a confusing mass of overlapping jurisdictions
and courts, oftentimes run by non-lawyers. The existence
of this patchwork only adds to the confusion of litigants.
As will be discussed later, litigants struggle already in
Id. at 41, 45.
Id. at 41–43.
78 Id. at 48.
79 Id. at 49.
80 In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 383 (Tex. 2011).
81 TEXAS RESEARCH LEAGUE, TEXAS COURTS: REPORT ONE, THE
TEXAS JUDICIARY: A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL OVERVIEW 49
(1990).
82 For more information on Texas’s judicial system, see
Guittard, infra, note 84; 2010 Annual Report for the Texas
Judiciary, OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION (Dec. 2010),
http://www.txcourts.gov/media/454879/2010-AnnualReport2_25_11.pdf.
76
77
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the quest for the proper trial court. Bifurcated courts of
last resort only add to the confusion and headache faced
by litigants, especially when they do not know which
appeals court has jurisdiction in their case.
c. Amendments Since 1891 Regarding the
Structure and Function of the Appellate
Courts in Texas.
In 1945 Texas increased the size of its supreme
court from three to nine justices.83 In 1966, Texas
increased the criminal court of appeals from three to five
members.84 Then, in 1977 the criminal court of appeals
increased to nine sitting judges.85 The court of appeals
has also changed significantly since 1891, including the
addition of criminal jurisdiction.
In 1978, Texas adopted a constitutional
amendment allowing for more than three members on
the court of civil appeals.86 In 1980, the criminal backlog
was so great that the average disposition of a criminal
appeal was three years.87 The resulting constitutional
amendment gave the court of appeals appellate
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal appeals, except
death penalty cases.88 This system is how the Texas
appellate courts operate today. There are fourteen
appellate districts, with varying numbers of judges on
each court. This appellate court has both civil and
criminal jurisdiction, with the sole exception of death
penalty cases. The Texas Supreme Court and Texas
S.J. Res. 8, 49th Reg. Sess. TEX. CONST. amend. art. V, § 2
(Tex. 1945).
84 Clarence Guittard, The Expanded Texas Courts of Appeals,
14 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 549, 551 (1983).
85 Id. at 552.
86 Worthen, supra note 62 at 38.
87 Guittard, supra note 84, at 552.
88 S.J. Res. 36, 66th Reg. Sess. TEX. CONST. amend. art. V, §§ 5,
6 (Tex. 1979).
83
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Court of Criminal Appeals each have nine justices and
exercise only civil or only criminal jurisdiction,
respectively. The stopgap legislation and patchwork
courts in Texas used to alleviate backlogs of cases has led
to the jurisdictional issues which will be taken up in Part
II, infra.
B. Oklahoma
1. 1907 Constitution
The original judiciary article of the Oklahoma
Constitution, ratified in 1907, provided specifically for a
supreme court, district courts, county courts, courts of
justices of the peace, municipal courts, and allowed for
the creation of a criminal court of appeals.89 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court maintained criminal
jurisdiction as long as there was not a statutorily created
criminal court of appeals.90 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court was composed of five justices, divided into five
judicial districts, nominated by political parties, and
voted for by the state in an at-large election.91 The term
of office was six years.92
District courts were courts of general jurisdiction,
and divided into twenty-one districts.93 County courts
were specifically for probate, matters in controversy less
than $1,000, and misdemeanors.94 County courts were
also courts of appeals for justice of the peace courts.95
Justice of the peace courts had concurrent jurisdiction
with county courts, but for less money, and lesser
offenses.96
OKLA. CONST. art. VII § 1 (1907).
Id. § 2.
91 Id. § 3.
92 Id.
93 Id. §§ 9, 10.
94 Id. §§ 12, 13.
95 Id. § 14.
96 Id. § 18.
89
90
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The first criminal court of appeals was created in
the 1907–1908 session of the Oklahoma legislature,
which was the first legislative session of Oklahoma.97
This act gave the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals
exclusive criminal appellate jurisdiction, with the
exception that the Oklahoma Supreme Court was to
make determinations of constitutionality, should they
arise.98 The 1909 legislature perpetuated the criminal
court of appeals, repealed all prior acts in conflict, and
gave it exclusive appellate jurisdiction of criminal
matters.99 The 1909 act created three judicial districts,
and provided for general elections of the judges.100 In
1959, the legislature changed the name of the Oklahoma
Criminal Court of Appeals to the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals.101
2. 1967 Amendment to the 1907 Constitution
There were other changes along the way, but in
1967, in response to serious criticism and cries for reform,
Oklahoma adopted a new judicial system.102 According to
Dean Earl Sneed of the University of Oklahoma Law
School, the judicial system of Oklahoma by the 1960s
was, “ancient, creaky, inefficient, outmoded, complex,
costly, and antiquated.”103 He further stated that the
system “was not good in 1907, and has grown
progressively worse in the fifty-eight years since
statehood[.]”104 While Oklahoma’s appeals courts
History of the Court, OKLAHOMA COURT OF CRIMINAL
APPEALS (2014), http://www.okcca.net/History.html.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Earl Sneed, Unfinished Business or All the Way in
One Play, 19 OKLA. L. REV. 5, 6 (1966) (expounding his
dissatisfaction with the system of justice in Oklahoma).
103 Sneed, supra note 102, at 7.
104 Id.
97
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remained largely unchanged since 1907, its lower courts
were a mess by the 1960s. Dean Sneed provided an
anecdote that illustrates the frustrating complexity of the
lower court system.
Fred [a research assistant to Dean Sneed]
produced seven pages of legal size, single
spaced material with just the most basic
facts about our court system. It would have
been longer, but I told Fred that because of
the virtual impossibility of the task, he
should omit any detail about police and
municipal courts and courts of specialized
jurisdiction such as the juvenile court in
Tulsa County, and that he should just
mention the superior and common pleas
courts which exist only in a few counties in
Oklahoma. And of course, since Fred did
that work in 1954, we have created small
claims courts, the children's court in
Oklahoma County, the aforementioned
special session courts, and city courts. I
have added three more pages to Fred's
work.105
At the appellate level, Dean Sneed’s derision of the
Oklahoma court system focused on judicial appointment
and selection, judicial salaries, and centralized
rulemaking power.106
One central impetus for the revision of the
Oklahoma judiciary was the scandal of the 1960s. It came
to be known that from the 1930s until the 1950s, Justice
N.S. Corn, along with possibly four other justices, took
bribes in exchange for dispositions in supreme court

Id. at 10.
Phillip Simpson, The Modernization and Reform of the
Oklahoma Judiciary, 3 OKLA. POL. 1, 6 (1994).
105
106
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cases.107 The scandal came to a head in 1956, with a
$150,000 bribe in the Selected Investment case.108 In July
of 1964, Justice Corn was sentenced to eighteen months
in prison.109 Justice Welch was also sentenced to prison,
and Justice Johnson was impeached.110 In 1966,
Oklahoma adopted a court on the judiciary.111
The battle for reform was hardly over. Once it was
clear that reform was necessary, Dean Sneed and the
legislature went to work.112 Dean Sneed would have to go
to the voters with an initiative petition in order to bypass
the legislature.113 During this time, anti-reformers were
ousted in the election of 1966.114 The Sneed plan was
submitted to the voters, but the legislature had already
devised its own reform plan.115 The voters rejected
Sneed’s plan, but reform was ultimately achieved
through the legislature.116
In July 1967, the constitutional provisions that
repealed and replaced the 1907 Article VII of the
Oklahoma Constitution were approved.117 “The two most
significant changes . . . [to Article VII were the creation
of] one state trial court of general jurisdiction[,] and . . .
[the creation of a judicial system] under the supervision
and control of the [S]upreme Court.”118 The Article

Id.
Id. See generally Selected Invs. Corp. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n,
309 P.2d 267 (1957).
109 Simpson, supra note 106, at 7.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 8.
112 Id. at 8–9.
113 Id. at 9.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 9–12.
116 Id. at 12.
117 George B. Fraser, Oklahoma’s New Judicial System, 21
OKLA. L. REV. 373 (1968).
118 Id. Note that although the Oklahoma Supreme Court is the
highest court, it still does not maintain jurisdiction in criminal
107
108
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further provides that justices of the supreme court and
court of criminal appeals shall be nominated by a
commission and appointed by the governor,119 and that
other judges are selected through a non-partisan
election.120 The constitution kept the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court
was to have the final say regarding jurisdiction if a
disagreement between the supreme court and the court
of criminal appeals arose.121
3. Current Operation
Oklahoma’s judiciary currently includes four
courts of limited jurisdiction, one trial court of general
jurisdiction, one civil appeals court, and the Oklahoma
Supreme Court and Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals as courts of last resort.122
The four courts of limited jurisdiction are
statutory courts.123 They include the Workers’
Compensation Court of Existing Claims, the Court of Tax
Review, the Municipal Courts not of Record, and the
Municipal Courts of Record.124 The workers’
compensation court and Court of Tax Review are
appealable directly to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. The
Municipal Court not of Record is appealed to the district
court.125 The Municipal Court of Record is appealable
matters. Criminal appeals still only go to the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals. OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
119 OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 4.
120 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9.
121 Id. § 4. Unfortunately, as will be discussed infra, the court
of criminal appeals does not always follow the jurisdictional
mandates of the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
122 The Oklahoma Judicial Center, Supreme Court Brochure
(2016), http://www.oscn.net/oscn/schome/fullbrochure.htm.
123 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1.
124 The Oklahoma Judicial Center, supra note 122.
125 Id.
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directly to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.126
District court decisions can be appealed to both the
Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals, depending on whether the matter is
civil or criminal.127
The civil appellate court in Oklahoma operates
differently than most judicial systems. The constitutional
amendment of 1967 allowed for the adoption of an
intermediate appellate court, and the resulting statute
requires the appeal to go to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, which then may assign appeals to the
intermediate courts unless otherwise provided by
statute.128 In other words, all appeals go to the supreme
court, which then decides which cases it gives to the court
of civil appeals. All decisions by the court of civil appeals
are final unless the Oklahoma Supreme Court grants
certiorari.129 The court of civil appeals currently has four
divisions, each with three judges. Two divisions are in
Tulsa County and the other two are in Oklahoma
County.130
The courts of last resort in Oklahoma are set up
differently than they are in Texas because Oklahoma
places ultimate power to decide jurisdictional conflicts in
the Oklahoma Supreme Court.131 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court is composed of nine members coming

Id.
Id.; see also OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
128 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 5.
129 Id. The statutes governing the Oklahoma Court of Civil
Appeals can be found in OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 30.1 (West
2017).
130 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 30.2 (West 2017). This law
became effective in 1982. 5 OKLA. PRAC., APPELLATE PRAC. §
1:26 (2016 ed.).
131 OKLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4. Texas courts of last resort are
coequal, which can result in instances where jurisdiction is
contested and there is no resolution. See discussion infra Part
II.A.
126
127
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from nine different districts.132 The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals maintains exclusive jurisdiction in
criminal appeals,133 and is composed now of five
members.134
II. Current Issues in Jurisdiction
Both Texas and Oklahoma suffer from “judicial
hot potato,” where the courts of last resort either fight
over jurisdiction to hear a case, or pass a case back and
forth until the case is either dismissed or forced upon one
of the courts. This usually results from hard cases that
have both civil and criminal aspects. Below, I will provide
examples of different cases that resulted in “judicial hot
potato” in each of the states’ courts of last resort, and
compare issues, where relevant, to the federal system.
A. Texas
This section will explore a few examples that
demonstrate the issues caused by Texas’s bifurcated
court structure. These cases involve contempt,135 a civil
exercise of a stay of execution,136 appeals from property
forfeiture orders in criminal prosecution,137 and the
exercise of equity jurisdiction to enjoin enforcement of
arguably unconstitutional penal laws.138 In the analysis
section, I will tie together the when and why of these
jurisdictional tangles.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1- 2 (West 2017).
Id. § 40 (West 2017).
134 Id. (West 2017). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals is
composed of nine members. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.112
(West 2017).
135 In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011).
136 Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 88
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
137 Bretz v. State, 508 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
138 Texas v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994).
132
133
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The primary drawback in a bifurcated court of last
resort system is determining which courts get which
cases when there are both civil and criminal aspects. In
Texas, an illustrative example of this situation occurred
in In Re Reece.139 In Reece, the Texas Supreme Court
grappled with the question of whether a litigant can be
held in contempt for perjury committed during a
deposition.140 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
refused to grant habeas review because the case that
gave rise to the contempt order was civil.141 The Texas
Supreme Court held that it could exercise mandamus
jurisdiction because the relator did not have an adequate
remedy by appeal, precisely because there was not a
criminal appeals court that would hear his habeas
petition.142
The Texas Supreme Court can only exercise
habeas jurisdiction when “the contemnor’s confinement
is on account of a violation of an order, judgment, or
decree previously made in a civil case.”143 The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, on the other hand, maintains
general habeas jurisdiction.144 The law giving the Texas
Supreme Court habeas jurisdiction was designed to keep
civil trials on the civil side of the bifurcated courts.145
Because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused to
hear the relator’s habeas petition, and the Texas
Supreme Court did not have habeas jurisdiction because
there was not a violation of a specific court order, the
relator claimed he was without adequate remedy by
appeal.146

341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011).
Id. at 362.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 369 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(e)).
144 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5.
145 See Tex. S.B. 36, 29th Leg., R.S. (1905).
146 Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 369.
139
140
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The Texas Supreme Court, through statutory
construction and reliance on prior case law, determined
that mandamus jurisdiction was broad enough to cover
instances in which an individual was wrongly held in
contempt.147 Because the statute in question grants
broad mandamus jurisdiction, and because there was no
prohibition on the use of mandamus to free someone from
confinement, the court reasoned that mandamus
jurisdiction was permissible.148 Ultimately, because the
Texas Supreme Court found that the underlying case
here was civil and there was no habeas jurisdiction, there
was no adequate remedy by appeal, and thus mandamus
jurisdiction could be used.149
Justice Willett’s dissent is the most informative
aspect of this case for this Article’s purposes, because he
outlines many of the flaws in Texas’s bifurcated court
system.150 Justice Willett noted the court of criminal
appeals’ “lateral[ed]” to the Texas Supreme Court
because they mistakenly believed that the supreme court
had habeas jurisdiction in this case.151 The supreme court
agreed, 9-0, that there was not habeas jurisdiction.152 The
Id. at 373–75.
Id; see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a).
149 Reece, 341 S.W.3d at 376.
150 See id. at 378–402 (Willett, J., dissenting). Justice Willett
begins his jurisdictional diatribe with statements such as,
“Unfortunately, the juris-imprudent design of the Texas
judiciary does not make the list. Today's case is a byproduct of
that recondite web, sparking a game of jurisdictional hot potato
between us and our constitutional twin, the Court of Criminal
Appeals.” Id. at 378.
151 Id. at 378 n.1. (“Although this Court does have the authority
to act in this case pursuant to Article 5, § 5, of the Texas
Constitution, we decline to do so. Effective 1981, Article 5, §
3(a) of the Texas Constitution was amended to give the Texas
Supreme Court and the Justices thereof the authority to issue
writs of habeas corpus.”) (quoting In re Reece, No. WR–72,199–
02, slip op. at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 29, 2009)).
152 See id. at 378.
147
148
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point Justice Willett made was that even the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals, the state court of last resort for
criminal cases, made a mistake navigating the judicial
labyrinth that Texas created.
Justice Willett also pointed out how difficult this
jurisdictional issue was (and continues to be) for
litigants. There is a stock letter informing litigants that
the Texas Supreme Court has no jurisdiction in a
particular area, directing them to re-file in the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals.153 Justice Willett described
other instances, discussed infra, in which there have
been jurisdictional quandaries between the two courts of
last resort.154
When Justice Willett arrived at the heart of the
immediate case, he argued that the Texas Supreme Court
did not have jurisdiction to grant mandamus.155 Both he
and the majority recognized that the supreme court is
prohibited by statute from using habeas jurisdiction.156
Nevertheless, Justice Willett contended that using
mandamus jurisdiction as a patch to do exactly what
habeas jurisdiction entails is prohibited by statute.157
Justice Willett countered the majority’s argument that
mandamus existed because there was no adequate
remedy at law by pointing out that there was an adequate
remedy by appeal through a motion for rehearing in the
court of criminal appeals.158 Justice Willett then pointed
out the perils of deciding this case via mandamus
jurisdiction: If the court granted mandamus here, when
Id. at 380.
Id. at 384 (including a notable case dealing with antisodomy laws in 1992).
155 Id. at 391.
156 Id.
157 Id. (“Where the Legislature has spoken clearly and removed
the kind of case now before us from our jurisdiction, it is
disingenuous to circumvent the rule by renaming the
remedy.”).
158 Id. at 399.
153
154
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the court of criminal appeals also has habeas jurisdiction,
litigants will be unsure of the proper court in which to
file.159 Finally, Justice Willett pointed to the issue of a
civil court hearing cases in which the appeal arises from
a criminal penalty.160 The Texas Supreme Court
acknowledged that the bifurcation issue between civil
and criminal cases is determined by the nature of the
court’s punishment.161 Justice Willett concluded his
dissent with some judicial “shade-throwing,”162 by
stating, “At the very least (and it grieves me to use these
six words) Texas should be more like Oklahoma” by
vesting one court with final determination of
jurisdictional questions.163
It is important to note that the distinction
between civil and criminal contempt in federal court can
also be a difficult line to draw. My argument throughout
is that a bifurcated system takes a difficult question and
Id. (“Similarly, this case leaves open the question of whether
and when a petitioner may seek review in both courts, and in
what order. Such confusion could lead to an unnecessarily
increased docket in either court, or at least wasted resources
spent shuffling cases between the two systems (or discussing
whether to do the shuffle in the first place).”).
160 Id. at 401 (“Further, hearing this case, and perhaps future
cases like it, may force us to handle appeals from civil cases
with criminal penalties, and force us at least in part to take on
quasi-criminal matters.”).
161 Id. at 371.
162 See Justice Don Willett (@JusticeWillett), TWITTER (Apr. 16,
2015, 7:10 PM), https://twitter.com/justicewillett/
status/588887181554417664 (using “throw shade” colloquially).
See generally Linette Lopez, This is Where the Expression
‘Throw Shade’ Comes From, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 4, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/where-the-expression-throwshade-comes-from-2015-3 (describing what it means to throw
shade).
163 Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 at 402 (describing his desire for a
court that has clear authority to determine jurisdiction, similar
to what Oklahoma’s judicial system contains).
159
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makes it harder. The decision as to whether an appeal
from a contempt order is civil or criminal “drives the
process that is required, including the type of notice, the
standard of proof, the relevance of the validity of the
underlying order, and the level of intent.”164 As Judge
Hartz has noted, the way federal courts determine civil
and criminal appeals hinges upon “the essential nature
of the action, not the underlying proceeding it arose from
. . . .”165 For contempt, this means the distinction is
whether the judgment is ordered to achieve compliance
with an order or to punish.166
Texas’s habeas statute attempts to meet this
distinction by only granting habeas powers to the Texas
Supreme Court if the confinement is in violation of a
court order. An individual was found in contempt of court
for lying during a deposition, not as a result of a court
order or decree previously made. It is clear that the
purpose of the contempt order in this case was to punish.
The real problem in this case was that the underlying
civil case resulted in what appears to be a criminal
contempt judgment. Thus, the purpose was criminal, but
the underlying proceeding was civil. While the federal
system may have difficulty distinguishing between
criminal and civil contempt at times, at least the courts
and litigants know which judge or court will decide the
issue. In Texas, the status of the underlying action is
added to the mix, which means that Judge Hartz’s
observation will not provide redress to Texas state court
litigators. One must take into account both the purpose
of the order and the underlying action. And, the litigator,
without the supreme court’s creation of the mandamus
16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3950.8 (4th ed. 2016).
165 In re Special Grand Jury 89–2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1167 (10th
Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 526
(4th Cir. 2000)).
166 See, e.g., Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 369–70
(1966).
164
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loophole, would actually be without a court to appeal a
criminal contempt order arising out of civil trial.
In Holmes, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held that they could exercise mandamus jurisdiction to
prevent an appeals court from exercising civil jurisdiction
over a stay of execution pending a hearing on clemency.167
The case concerned inmate Gary Graham, who was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death. This
particular case was an attempt by Graham to force the
Board of Pardon and Paroles to hear Graham’s request
for clemency through an injunction. The district court
entered an order to either provide a hearing or enjoin the
execution until the hearing occurred.168 The Board
appealed, and the court of appeals entered an injunction
preventing the execution.169 The relators (the district
attorney and the Board of Pardons and Pleas) appealed
up to the court of criminal appeals seeking a writ of
mandamus.170 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
found that the stay of execution was a criminal law
matter because capital punishment only arises from
capital murder convictions.171
Judge Meyers noted in dissent that the
controversy surrounding this case arose from the
bifurcated nature of Texas courts of last resort,172
identifying the language in the Texas Constitution that
gave rise to the confusion in this case.173 If “criminal law
Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 885
S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
168 Id. at 391.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 394.
172 Id. at 418 (Meyers, J., dissenting).
173 Id. (“Our Constitution provides that the Supreme Court’s
‘appellate jurisdiction shall be final and shall extend to all
cases except in criminal law matters,’” while “[t]his Court, on
the other hand, has ‘final appellate jurisdiction . . . in all
criminal cases of whatever grade . . . .’” (quoting TEX. CONST.
art. V, §§ 3, 5)).
167
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matters” and “criminal cases,” as used in the state
constitution, mean the same thing, then the court of
criminal appeals would have exclusive jurisdiction.174
But if they mean something different, then it is possible
that there is overlapping jurisdiction with civil courts.175
Judge Meyers suspected that the majority of the court
refused to allow this case to go through a normal appeal
process for fear of it being appealed to the Texas Supreme
Court instead of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
and thus stepped in to prevent that possibility.176 Judge
Meyers ended his dissent with a scathing statement
regarding the jurisdictional warfare that he accused the
majority of waging:
Our entire manner has had the
appearance of a guerilla raid, when it
should instead have been a cooperative
effort to construe fundamental aspects of
Texas constitutional law. In the process,
we have violated basic principles of our
own mandamus jurisprudence, encouraged
the misuse of habeas corpus, and
shamelessly interrupted an appellate
process which was running exactly as
prescribed by law, and which might very
well have produced results better than
expected by the majority had it been
permitted to proceed to final judgment.177
Bretz v. State, which involved an individual
acquitted of receiving and concealing stolen property and
Holmes v. Honorable Court of Appeals for Third Dist., 885
S.W.2d 389, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (Meyers, J.,
dissenting).
175 Id.
176 Id. at 418–19. (stating that Judge Meyers himself is not
willing to “fight a turf war with other Texas courts”).
177 Id. at 421.
174
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ordered to return the property to the complaining
witness, provides a much simpler example.178 The
defendant in the case appealed the order to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals,179 but the court held that it
did not have jurisdiction.180 Judge Roberts concurred and
took time to expound the issues presented with
bifurcated appeals.181 Judge Roberts lamented that even
though this appeal came from a judgment in a criminal
trial governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure in
Texas, the court had to send Bretz “on his way to begin
yet another search for the proper forum,”182 which, in this
case, was the Texas Supreme Court.
In addition to forfeiture, Judge Roberts brought to
light a few other instances of the confusion litigants face
in Texas’s bifurcated court system.183 For example, bond
forfeiture proceedings are reviewed by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, yet are governed by the rules of civil
procedure.184 When a defendant seeks a writ of
mandamus to enforce his right to a speedy trial, the
defendant must file his petition for the writ in the Texas
Supreme Court, not the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
where presumably the defendant later will be able to
appeal a conviction and argue that he was denied the
right to a speedy trial.185
The federal courts face similar issues. Bond
forfeiture proceedings are civil;186 property forfeiture

Bretz v. State, 508 S.W.2d 97, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
Id.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 98 (“Further, I feel that this case presents an excellent
example of a problem often encountered in this State.”).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 98–99.
184 Id.
185 Id.; see also Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex. 1971)
(judgment set aside on other grounds).
186 United States v. Plechner, 577 F.2d 596, 597 (9th Cir. 1978).
178
179
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proceedings are criminal.187 But in Texas, the outcomes
can be absurd. A court that has jurisdiction solely in
criminal matters must use the rules of civil procedure.
That scenario cannot exist in a unified system.
One high profile case in Texas highlighting the
problems inherent in a bifurcated court structure came
in 1994 with a challenge to Texas’s anti-sodomy law.188 In
State v. Morales, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the
Texas anti-sodomy law, a criminal statute, could be
declared unconstitutional by the Texas Supreme Court
only if it resulted in an irreparable injury to a property
right.189 The majority held that the court should avoid
construing rights concerning a penal statute and further
expressed pragmatic concerns with conflicting opinions
between the two courts of last resort, noting that the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals also refused to exercise
its jurisdiction in this Texas constitutional challenge.190
It is not clear why the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
declined to hear this case, although one could postulate
that because there was no criminal prosecution, the court
saw no need to take jurisdiction. As a result, the lower
court’s decision declaring the law unconstitutional was
reversed, and the matter was remanded to the trial court
to dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.191 Thus, both
of Texas’s courts of last resort decided that they lacked
jurisdiction in this case. What is the point of having two
courts of last resort if neither of them can take a
particular case?
Another question arises from the Morales cases:
How might one case end up in front of both courts of last
resort? The Attorney General appealed to both courts at
the same time. The Attorney General was quoted as
United States v. De Los Santos, 260 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir.
2001).
188 State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994).
189 Id. at 942.
190 Id. at 948 n.16.
191 Id. at 949.
187
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saying, “We want to make sure we're not locked out of an
appeal. It was either file with both or roll the dice.”192
Even the Attorney General’s office, the law firm of Texas,
was unsure how to navigate the bifurcated court
structure.
B. Oklahoma
Oklahoma’s judiciary, although not loved by all
members of the Oklahoma bar, seems to enjoy fewer
jurisdictional quandaries than Texas as a result of the
1967 large-scale judicial reforms. However, issues still
remain with Oklahoma’s bifurcated system of courts,
including the exercise of civil jurisdiction to enjoin an
execution, juvenile delinquency, and contempt.193
The procedural paths of Clayton Lockett and
Charles Warner’s cases through the Oklahoma judiciary
form a most tangled web. Warner was convicted at trial
of first-degree murder and first-degree rape.194 The trial
court’s conviction was reversed, and the case was
remanded for a new trial.195 Warner’s second trial also
resulted in conviction for first-degree murder and firstdegree rape.196 This time, on appeal, Warner’s conviction
was upheld.197 After losing in the Oklahoma Court of
In re Coy Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 385 n.68 (Tex. 2011)
(quoting Janet Elliott, State Appeals Twice in Sodomy Case,
But Neither High Court May Want ‘Hot Potato’, TEX.
LAWYER, May 18, 1992, at 1).
193 See, e.g., Carder v. Court of Crim. App., 595 P.2d 416 (Okla.
1978) (deciding a jurisdictional issue against the determination
made by the court of criminal appeals); Ronald N. Ricketts,
Indirect Contempt in Oklahoma, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 213 (1974)
(discussing the thorny issue of the quasi-criminal nature of
contempt in a bifurcated appeal system).
194 See generally Warner v. State, 29 P.3d 569 (Okla. Crim. App.
2001).
195 Id. at 575.
196 Warner v. State, 144 P.3d 838, 896 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).
197 Id.
192
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Criminal Appeals, Warner appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which denied certiorari.198 Warner then filed a
writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma.199 The writ was denied,
and Warner appealed to the Tenth Circuit, where the
district court’s decision was affirmed.200 Warner then
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and the writ of
certiorari once again was denied.201
Clayton Derrell Lockett was charged with
conspiracy, first-degree burglary, assault with a
dangerous weapon, forcible oral sodomy, first-degree
rape, kidnapping, robbery by force and fear, and firstdegree murder.202 Lockett was convicted on all nine
counts and sentenced to death.203 The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court below.204
Lockett then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, where
the petition for a writ of certiorari was denied.205 Lockett
then filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, where the
writ was denied and judgment was entered against
Lockett.206 Lockett appealed to the Tenth Circuit where
the judgment was affirmed.207 Certiorari was denied by
the U.S. Supreme Court.208
Lockett and Warner then joined as plaintiffs and
filed a petition for declaratory relief and requested an
injunction against the Oklahoma Department of
Warner v. Oklahoma, 550 U.S. 942 (2007).
Warner v. Workman, 814 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (W.D. Okla.
2011).
200 Warner v. Trammell, 520 Fed. Appx. 675 (10th Cir. 2013).
201 Warner v. Trammell, 134 S. Ct. 924 (2014).
202 Lockett v. State, 53 P.3d 418, 421 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002).
203 Id.
204 Id. at 431.
205 Lockett v. Oklahoma, 538 U.S. 982 (2003).
206 Lockett v. Workman, No. CIV-03-734-F, 2011 WL 10843368
(W.D. Okla. Jan. 19, 2011).
207 Lockett v. Trammel, 711 F.3d 1218, 1255 (10th Cir. 2013).
208 Lockett v. Trammel, 134 S. Ct. 924 (2014).
198
199

[193]
33

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2

Corrections on a challenge to the constitutionality of an
Oklahoma statute209 that concealed the identity of the
drugs to be used in their executions.210 The Oklahoma
Attorney General’s Office removed the case to the United
States District Court, due to Lockett and Warner’s
invocation of the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.211 Lockett and Warner then amended their
complaint to remove federal issues, and the case was
remanded back to the Oklahoma district court.212 The
Oklahoma district court then found that jurisdiction for
issuing a temporary injunction lays solely in the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.213 Plaintiffs
appealed the trial court’s order finding jurisdiction lays
solely in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.214 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court remanded the declaratory judgment matter to the
trial court for resolution of civil matters, and transferred
the emergency stay of execution motion to the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals.215 During this time, however,
the state of Oklahoma was unable to procure execution
drugs, and thus a thirty-day stay was entered and the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the
emergency stay motion as moot.216
The district court then ruled on the declaratory
judgment and
found
the confidentiality
law
unconstitutional under the Oklahoma Constitution as a
See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 1015(B) (2011) (“The
identity of all persons who participate in or administer the
execution process and persons who supply the drugs, medical
supplies or medical equipment for the execution shall be
confidential and shall not be subject to discovery in any civil or
criminal proceedings.”).
210 Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 58, 58 (Okla. 2014).
211 Id. at 59.
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 60.
209
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denial of the plaintiffs’ right to access the courts.217 The
plaintiffs then sought a stay of execution pending the
appeal of the district court’s declaratory judgment.218 The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, however, denied
the stay of execution, holding that it may only issue a stay
of execution pending a challenge to conviction or sentence
of death.219 The plaintiffs again appealed to the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, which exercised jurisdiction
in deciding the constitutional question220 but ruled that
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals maintained
jurisdiction to issue a stay of execution.221 Thus, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court—per its constitutional
authority—instructed the court of criminal appeals to
take jurisdiction.222 Unfortunately, this was not the end
of the judicial hot potato.
Upon receiving the case from the Oklahoma
Supreme Court for a second time, and after a clear
pronouncement of jurisdiction from that court, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to exercise
its jurisdiction and held:
While the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
authority to deem an issue civil and so
Id.
Id.
219 Lockett v. State, 329 P.3d 755, 759 (Okla. Crim. App. 2014).
Note the similarity to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeal’s
denial of review in Reece. Because the appeal arose out of a civil
matter, the Reece court denied relief.
220 Lockett v. Evans, 377 P.3d 1254, 1254 (Okla. 2014).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 1254–55 (“In exercising our constitutional power to
determine jurisdiction, we transfer ‘only’ the Application for
Emergency Stay to the Court of Criminal Appeals. In so doing,
we urge the appellate criminal court to be cognizant of the time
restraints associated with the submission of the appeal(s) to
this Court along with the gravity of the first impression
constitutional issues this Court will be charged with in
addressing the civil appeal, or appeals.”).
217
218
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within its jurisdiction, it does not have the
power to supersede a statute and
manufacture jurisdiction in this Court for
Appellants’ stay request by merely
transferring it here. Therefore, Appellants’
application for stays of execution is
DENIED.223
In response to the court of criminal appeals’ refusal to
exercise its jurisdiction, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
wrote:
On April, 17, 2014, Thursday
last, we exercised our constitutional
authority to determine the appropriate
tribunal for resolution of the stay issue
under the Oklahoma Constitution, Article
7, section 4, vesting this Court with the
sole power to determine whether the
jurisdiction of the stay issue was within
this Court or the Court of Criminal
Appeals. In so doing, we transferred the
request for stay “alone” to the Court of
Criminal Appeals.
The majority of the Court of
Criminal Appeals refused to exercise this
Court's order and to address the merits of
the stay. That order, which we consider to
be invalid as not having followed the
constitutional directive of this Court, have
[sic] now resulted in a situation never
contemplated
by
the
drafters
of
Oklahoma's ultimate rule of law—that this
tribunal be inserted into death penalty

223

Lockett, 329 P.3d at 758.
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cases. A position generally reserved for the
Court of Criminal Appeals.224
As a result, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined
that the rule of necessity required them to take
jurisdiction in this case to issue a stay of execution
pending the outcome of the civil challenge to the
confidentiality statute.225 For the first time in the state’s
history, the Oklahoma Supreme Court took jurisdiction
in a death penalty appeal.226 Unfortunately, the stay of
execution was not the end of the matter.
In the final opinion issued before the executions of
Lockett and Warner, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
appeared to backpedal. The supreme court reversed the
trial court’s decision, which held section 22.1015(B)
unconstitutional.227 The supreme court also dissolved its
stay of execution.228 The concurrence rings of “I told you
so,” when Justice Taylor writes:
I warned this Court in my previous
dissents against crossing the Rubicon and
now that crossing has caused a quagmire.
Had this Court transferred all issues in
this appeal to the Court of Criminal
Appeals as I previously advocated, the
matter would have been resolved without
this Court ignoring precedent and the
Court of Criminal Appeals’ role in our
judicial system.229

Lockett v. Evans, 356 P.3d 58, 61 (Okla. 2014) (emphasis in
original).
225 Id.
226 Id. at 62 (Taylor, J., dissenting).
227 Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 491 (Okla. 2014).
228 Id. at 492.
229 Id. at 493 (Taylor, J., concurring).
224
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Why did the court experience such a rapid aboutface regarding these jurisdictional issues? Between the
opinion issuing a stay of execution on April 21, 2014, and
the opinion dissolving the stay of execution on April 23,
2014, some unusual events transpired in the governance
of Oklahoma. First, Governor Mary Fallin proclaimed
that she would not comply with the Oklahoma Supreme
Court’s stay of execution, stating, “I cannot give effect to
the order by that honorable court.”230 Let that sink in:
The executive branch of Oklahoma refused to comply
with the stay of execution issued by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, and would execute the inmates
regardless, by reasoning that the supreme court’s
“attempted stay of execution is outside the constitutional
authority of that body” and that only an order by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would be binding
in this case.231 The next day Representative Mike
Christian of the Oklahoma legislature began
impeachment proceedings against the justices in the
majority opinion issuing the stay of execution.232 As a
result, the supreme court reversed its position and
allowed the executions to proceed, despite the secrecy of
the drugs—the very same drugs that caused Warner’s
last word to be, “My body is on fire.”233
What ultimately caused this jurisdictional hot
potato was the insertion of a civil suit into a death row
case. The Oklahoma Supreme Court felt compelled by
necessity to enter the “quagmire” of a suit requesting a
stay of execution in order to decide the constitutional
implications of the government’s policy forbidding
disclosure of the lethal injection drugs. Events like this
could not occur in the federal system. Every Article III
Andrew Cohen, Oklahoma Just Neutered its State Supreme
Court, THE WEEK, (Apr. 29, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/
447457/oklahoma-just-neutered-state-supreme-court.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Murphy, supra note 15.
230
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court has the authority to decide the entire controversy
(subject to subject matter jurisdiction) regardless of the
civil or criminal aspects. A federal court may struggle to
determine which rules of procedure may apply, but there
is no question as to which court has the ability to hear a
case. While the story of Charles Warner and Clayton
Lockett is certainly a dramatic example of the pitfalls of
bifurcated courts of last resort, there are others that
generate less controversy.
In Carder v. Court of Criminal Appeals, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the court of criminal
appeals lacked jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition,
a demand for a change of custody hearing for a juvenile
who had been adjudicated delinquent and a ward of the
state.234 The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals does not have
general supervisory jurisdiction of lower courts, and
cannot hear cases that do not arise out of criminal
matters.235 It is important to note that had this appeal
originated from an adjudication of delinquency or
certification to stand trial as an adult, the result would
have been different. But because the matter was instead
a subsequent court action where the father sought to
return his son to his custody, there was no longer court of
criminal appeals jurisdiction.
A jurisdictional tug-of-war between the Oklahoma
Supreme Court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals that remains unresolved is that of contempt,
which, as already noted, has aspects of both criminal and
civil jurisdiction. Contempt, according to the Oklahoma
Supreme Court, is sui generis and not criminal. In the
federal system, contempt can be either criminal or civil.
The distinction lies in whether the purpose is to punish
or to induce compliance.
In State ex rel. Attorney General v. Owens, the
dispute arose out of the contempt conviction of a certain
234
235

595 P.2d 416, 418 (Okla. 1978).
Id. at 419.
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Mr. O. O. Owens, who published defamatory statements
about some of the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s
members.236 From a federal perspective, the purpose was
to punish Mr. Owens for his statements. Owens filed a
habeas petition with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals after being found in contempt by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court.237 The supreme court directed a writ of
prohibition to the court of criminal appeals regarding the
habeas petition, but the court of criminal appeals
proceeded anyway and ordered Owens’s release.238 Once
again, here is an instance in which the constitutionallysuperior Oklahoma Supreme Court is defied by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. One can hardly
blame the court of criminal appeals, however, because
the punishment of Mr. Owens for his defamatory
statements appears to be criminal through any lens.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court subsequently
quashed the order of release in Dancy v. Owens.239
Fortunately, in this case—juxtaposed with the Lockett v.
Evans saga—the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
did not act in further contravention of the holding of the
supreme court.240 Less fortunate is the fact that there
still remains jurisdictional confusion with regard to
contempt because the court of criminal appeals held that
contempt is a misdemeanor in Roselle v. State241 and the
supreme court still maintained that contempt is sui
generis in Young v. Woodson.242 As noted above in my
State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Owens, 256 P. 704, 705 (Okla.
1927).
237 See Ricketts, supra note 193, at 216.
238 See generally Ex parte Owens, 258 P. 758 (Okla. Crim. App.
1927).
239 258 P. 879 (1927).
240 See Ricketts, supra note 193, at 217 (noting that it was not
until forty years after Dancy that the Oklahoma Supreme
Court once again addressed contempt).
241 503 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
242 519 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1974).
236
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discussion of contempt in Texas, it is often difficult to
determine whether contempt is civil or criminal. But once
again, the difficulty is exacerbated when two courts of
last resort have to decide the question.
III. Attempts to Eliminate Bifurcated Courts
A. Texas
Texas has not been silent in its desire to eliminate
the bifurcated court system. There have been four
distinct proposals in the past twenty years to eliminate
the bifurcated court system, some introduced more than
once.243 The 1993 effort proposed to eliminate the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals and transfer all criminal cases
to the Texas Supreme Court. A 1999 proposal would have
merged the two courts into one high court composed of
fifteen justices: seven would be appointed by the
governor, seven would be elected, and the chief justice
would be appointed and had to be from a different district
than the previous appointment.244 In 2003, the proposal
was substantially the same as 1993—eliminate the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals and transfer jurisdiction to
the Texas Supreme Court.245 In 2011 and 2013, the same
bill to eliminate the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was
introduced.246 Unfortunately, none of the bills presented
received any real consideration.247

Bill Raftery, Trying to Eliminate the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals: Will Fourth Attempt in 20 years Succeed?,
GAVEL TO GAVEL (Dec. 6, 2012), http://gaveltogavel.us/
2012/12/06/trying-to-eliminate-the-texas-court-of-criminalappeals-will-fourth-attempt-in-20-years-succeed/.
244 Id.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 See id. (noting that only a few bills even received a hearing).
243
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B. Oklahoma
Oklahoma, despite the controversies it has
endured, has had far less legislative attempts to
eliminate its bifurcated court structure. Although it has
been criticized on record as early as 1919 at a meeting of
the Oklahoma State Bar Association,248 there have only
been two instances of proposed reforms since the Sneed
plan in 1967.249 One was an attempt to create a third
court of last resort specifically for capital cases.250
Oklahoma’s other attempt to modify its court structure
occurred in 2012; the proposal called for the elimination
of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals as well as the
transfer of the power of constitutional review by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court to an ad hoc court of
constitutional review created by the legislature.251
IV. Analysis
A bifurcated court system causes unique
jurisdictional “quagmires.” Bifurcating criminal and civil
jurisdiction is usually intuitive and simple in the vast
majority of cases, but there are enough significant issues
PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
OKLAHOMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 126 (Walter Lybrand,
ed.1919) (discussing a wholescale replacement of the
Oklahoma judiciary, including a single supreme court).
249 See Simpson, supra note 106 (noting that the Sneed plan
was defeated).
250 H.R.J. Res. 1022, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015)
(introduced by the same individual who introduced articles of
impeachment against the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
response to the Lockett debacle).
251 See S.J. Res. 83, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2012); Bill Raftery,
Recent Legislative Efforts to Eliminate, or Create, Bifurcated
Criminal and Civil Appellate Courts, GAVEL TO GAVEL (Apr. 30,
2014), http://gaveltogavel.us/2014/04/30/recent-legislative-effortsto-eliminate-or-create-bifurcated-criminal-and-civil-appellatecourts/.
248
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to justify greater scrutiny of the system. Oklahoma and
Texas are the only two states in the union that maintain
this judicial system. No other state (including those with
large populations such as California, New York, and
Florida) maintains a bifurcated system of courts of last
resort. If the overwhelming majority of states and the
federal system maintain a single court of last resort,
there might be good reason for Oklahoma and Texas to
consider following the crowd.
Texas and Oklahoma suffer from failures to
distinguish between civil and criminal jurisdiction in
cases that maintain aspects of both. These cases create
confusion for litigants as well as inter-judicial warring.
Texas and Oklahoma do not have a compelling
justification for maintaining bifurcated courts and should
either combine the two courts into one, or develop a
bifurcated system of intermediate appellate courts, with
one court of last resort that has full appellate jurisdiction
for all matters.
When one looks at the cases listed in Part II, one
can find a unifying theme in the jurisdictional
quandaries in which these courts have found themselves.
In every single case outlined above, there have been
aspects of both civil and criminal jurisdiction. In re Reece
involved contempt in the context of a civil deposition.252
This case arose out of a civil case, but was essentially a
habeas petition, which the Texas Supreme Court
generally cannot hear.253 However, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals refused to hear the habeas petition
because it determined the case was civil in nature,
arising from a civil case.254 In Oklahoma, contempt
jurisdiction is still unresolved. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court determined that contempt is sui generis,255 but the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided that
In Re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011).
Id.
254 Id. at 362.
255 Young v. Woodson, 519 P.2d 1357 (Okla. 1974).
252
253

[203]
43

TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
VOLUME 12 | WINTER 2018 | ISSUE 2

contempt is a misdemeanor and thus under its sole
jurisdiction.256
One might point to the federal system and suggest
that contempt is a difficult distinction even for a unified
court system.257 This underscores my point. If it is
difficult for a single court, it is even more complicated for
a bifurcated system. At the end of the process, at least
the litigant has the promise of finality in a unified
system. The U.S. Supreme Court can make a
determination and it will be the end of the matter. In
Oklahoma and Texas, the litigant still does not know! If
past performance is evidence of future conduct, Texas’s
and Oklahoma’s high courts will play judicial hot potato
again.
Other examples where the federal courts have
struggled to determine the difference between civil and
criminal jurisdiction include: appeals from criminal
forfeiture,258 appeals from firearms prohibitions imposed
on felons,259 and appeals from denials of requests to
release grand jury transcripts for use in a habeas
proceeding.260 In each of these cases there are aspects of
both civil and criminal jurisdiction, yet the firearms
appeals and the jury transcript requests were both held
to be civil and the forfeiture of assets appeal was held to
be criminal. In Texas and Oklahoma, the supreme court
must think about how the court of criminal appeals would
rule, and vice versa, in order to prevent jurisdictional
holes or gaps from propagating. Reece is a perfect
example. The Texas Supreme Court had to contort its
Rosell v. State, 503 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
See, e.g., Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 827–28 (1994).
258 United States v. De Los Santos, 260 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir.
2001).
259 Palma v. U.S., Dept. of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, 228
F.3d 323, 327 (3d Cir. 2000).
260 United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir.
1993).
256
257
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jurisdiction to meet a gap in habeas jurisdiction.261 At
least unified systems will generate an answer that will
effectively guide litigants, and keep them from having to
“roll the dice.”262
Litigants themselves struggle to navigate the
system. In State v. Morales,263 the Attorney General of
Texas appealed to both the Texas Supreme Court and the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, not knowing which
court had jurisdiction. In Bretz v. State, a litigant
appealed an order to return property that he was
acquitted of stealing.264 One could reasonably assume
that because the order came from a criminal trial, the
appeal would be to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
Unfortunately, Texas maintains that this appeal belongs
in a civil appeals court, not criminal. Texas does follow
the federal rule,265 but in Texas, one has to file an entirely
new motion and appeal to an entirely different court if
the original appeal was brought in the wrong court. In
federal court, a litigant could simply amend her motion
and remain in front of the same court.
Because it is difficult to determine which court of
last resort has jurisdiction, litigants have to expend more
resources identifying the appropriate appellate forum,
and judicial resources are wasted determining which
court has jurisdiction. The Lockett/Warner debacle is a
perfect example: A case was bounced around for years
with the courts fighting over who did or did not have
jurisdiction.
Texas and Oklahoma have experienced interjudicial warring because of their bifurcated court
structures. In re Reece is an example where the Texas
Supreme Court essentially had to step in and take
In Re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. 2011).
See supra note 192.
263 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994).
264 508 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
265 See, e.g., United States v. Madden, 95 F.3d 38, 39 n.1 (10th
Cir. 1996).
261
262
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jurisdiction because the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
refused.266 In Oklahoma, Lockett v. Evans passed in front
of the Oklahoma Supreme Court six times after being
sent to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on
multiple occasions.267 In Texas, it is understandable that
the courts of last resort must tread lightly in deferring to
the other court. The two courts are coequal, both provided
for in the constitution and both with final appellate
jurisdiction in their respective spheres.268 In Texas there
is no ultimate authority to decide jurisdictional mistakes.
If both courts deny jurisdiction, there is no court to hear
the case. This is a serious problem that could only be
resolved through a constitutional amendment, because
interpretation of jurisdiction is a constitutional matter.
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court has the
constitutional power to decide final jurisdictional issues,
it appears to be illusory. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
made a final adjudication in Lockett v. Evans, holding
that the court of criminal appeals had jurisdiction, yet
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals refused to
exercise its jurisdiction in that case.269
Thus, we find that the expense and headache
created by the bifurcated system is not worth the candle.
The system is inefficient, confusing, and contentious. The
arguments in favor of the system are dispelled below.
The argument that Texas and Oklahoma require
bifurcated courts to handle a more significant caseload is
not a compelling one. For instance, the California
Supreme Court received 9,739 matters in 2013.270 By
comparison, the Texas Supreme Court received only 778
and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals received 5,875,
See supra Part II.A.
Lockett v. Evans, 330 P.3d 488, 493 (Okla. 2014) (Taylor, J.,
concurring).
268 See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2–3, 5.
269 Lockett, 330 P.3d 488.
270 JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2013 CALIFORNIA COURT
STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS xvi (2013).
266
267
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for a total court of last resort case disposition of 6,653
matters.271 This shows that California, with one court,
was able to complete 3,086 more matters than Texas with
two courts. Oklahoma, being a far less populous state,
also cannot justify its bifurcated system based on the
number of matters disposed.
The argument that a bifurcated court of last resort
system increases the expertise of the judiciary does not
outweigh the problems such a system creates. There is
little evidence to suggest that federal courts suffer from
a lack of expertise in disposing of criminal or civil
matters, except for the occasional issue such as ERISA or
patent litigation.272 Even if Oklahoma and Texas want to
keep their expert judges in criminal and civil matters,
they could do so through specialized mid-level appeals
courts, which I will outline infra.
In light of these jurisdictional issues and the
examples from the vast majority of other states, my
recommendation is that both Texas and Oklahoma
should abolish their bifurcated court system. There
should be three constitutional courts including a trial
court of general jurisdiction, an appeals court with
general appellate jurisdiction, and one supreme court
with general appellate jurisdiction. This would require
the elimination of the current system in Oklahoma where
the Oklahoma Supreme Court handles all appeals and
has discretion in passing appeals down to the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals.
OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2013 24, 30
(2013).
272 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition Insights Into
Judicial Decisionmaking in Employee Benefits Cases, 3 LAB. &
EMP. L. F. 2 (2013) (arguing for specialized judges to handle
ERISA litigation); William Watkins, We Need a Specialized
Patent
Trial Court,
LAW 360
(Oct.
20,
2014),
http://www.law360.com/articles/583409/we-need-aspecialized-patent-trial-court.
271
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Texas would eliminate a significant number of its
own courts, including county courts and justice of the
peace courts. I also recommend that Texas reduce the
total number of courts of appeal from the current
fourteen to a more manageable six or seven. Texas should
increase the number of judges on the courts of appeal,
and limit the districts to readily discernable geographic
and demographic areas. This will decrease the role of the
Texas Supreme Court as an arbiter of district splits and
allow it to grant certiorari on appeals that present novel
and important issues.
If, on the other hand, Texas and Oklahoma would
like to maintain the specialization in having a bifurcated
appeals system, there is still room to clean up the
jurisdictional conflicts. In the late 1960s, Tennessee and
Alabama both instituted bifurcated mid-level appellate
courts.273 Neither state has attempted to amend or
eliminate its system in the past twenty years.274
There are numerous benefits of a bifurcated midlevel appeals court with a single court of last resort. The
mid-level appeals courts would develop significant
specialties in their respective jurisdiction, thus
maintaining one of the principal arguments in favor of
the bifurcated courts of last resort while decreasing
jurisdictional headaches. The courts would have less
work, and thus could reach a disposition more quickly.275
Additionally, the supreme court may come to be viewed
as playing more of an administrative role, with the midlevel courts acting similar to a court of last resort. I
See Raftery, supra note 243 (listing both Alabama and
Tennessee as states that have bifurcated mid-level appellate
courts).
274 Id.
275 For example, Tennessee’s mid-level courts of appeal
maintained near or above a 100% clearance rate. See
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE TENNESSEE JUDICIARY: FISCAL YEAR 2013‐2014 11, 13
(2014).
273
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would, however, allow mandatory supreme court
jurisdiction for death penalty cases due to the incredibly
sensitive nature of those cases.
The mid-level court would in most instances be
the last court that litigants see. Without a right of appeal
to the supreme court (except in capital cases), the midlevel appeals courts would have final authority on nearly
all decisions. Only in cases where the supreme court
either finds serious errors in reasoning, circuit splits, or
jurisdictional mistakes would it review a case. Thus,
these specialized courts would for most purposes remain
the last court to which litigants argue.
If there are questions regarding jurisdictional
issues between the mid-level courts (which, as we have
seen from bifurcated courts of last resort, is inevitable)
the supreme court could easily dispose of the
jurisdictional issue and the lower courts would be bound.
There would be no debacles like Reece or Lockett because
the supreme court would have ultimate authority on all
issues of state law.
For example, if we apply the novel mid-level
bifurcated structure to the facts of Reece, where the Texas
Supreme Court used a tenuous interpretation of its
mandamus power to prevent a significant gap in
appellate review, there would have been a different
outcome.276 If the mid-level court of criminal appeals
denied jurisdiction, the civil appeals court would likely
have never entered the picture. The appeal of the denial
of habeas would go up to the unified supreme court of last
resort, where that court presumably would have
determined that the court of criminal appeals did have
jurisdiction in this case. Because the unified supreme
court is a higher court and sets binding precedent for the
court of criminal appeals, that court would have heard
the case and disposed of the issue.
Cases like Bretz v. State would also be avoided.
Litigants would have the knowledge that if a mistake
276

See supra Part II.A.
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concerning jurisdiction was made on their part, the
supreme court could remand to the proper court.
Additionally, when the mistaken jurisdiction of the
litigant is clear to the mid-level court reviewing the case,
Texas and Oklahoma could institute a process similar to
the process set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1631.277 This would
allow a civil court to transfer a case to a criminal court
and vice versa.278 The result would be preservation of the
case to avoid timing issues in appeals. Further, if there
were a mistake on the part of the transferring court, the
supreme court would have the authority to make a final
determination and remand for adjudication. There would
still remain extra expense in litigation, but there also
would be the added benefit of judicial expertise in
specialized courts.
One might question whether the outcome of
Lockett would have been any different in a system of
bifurcated intermediate courts. I argue that it would. On
the first appeal, Lockett would appeal to either the
criminal or civil court of appeals. If he appealed to the
wrong court, or the court incorrectly determined that it
did not have jurisdiction, the case would be appealed up
to the unified supreme court. This court would be able to
make a single determination regarding which court had
jurisdiction, and its decree would be binding law on all
parties. There would not be the denial of the order by the
court of criminal appeals because the unified supreme
court is objectively higher. Even if the mid-level court of
criminal appeals defied the order of the unified supreme
court (which is highly unlikely), the supreme court would
have jurisdiction to decide the case itself, thus
eliminating the tenuous judicial acrobatics necessary to
shoehorn civil into criminal, or vice versa. As Justice
Jackson famously wrote, “We are not final because we are
infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
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final.”279 One court of last resort eliminates a contest of
equals jockeying for position and creates finality binding
on all.
V. Conclusion
“Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice
is as old as law. Not to go outside our own legal system,
discontent has an ancient and unbroken pedigree.”280 The
Texas and Oklahoma judiciary systems are problematic.
In Oklahoma, the result of a judicial hot potato led to the
botched execution of a convicted murderer using
experimental drugs.281 In Texas, the Texas Supreme
Court used mandamus jurisdiction for what was
essentially a habeas petition, because the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that it did not have jurisdiction to
hear a writ of habeas corpus arising from an individual
being held in contempt in an underlying civil trial,
despite the fact that the purpose of the contempt order
was criminal punishment.282 These jurisdictional issues
affect real human beings and deserve the attention of
legislators and reformers. Texas and Oklahoma should
seriously consider amending their constitutions to
reconstruct their judicial systems to contain only one
court of last resort with general appellate jurisdiction in
order to ensure there will always be a court to hear a case.
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